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It is often claimed, with regard to the emerging market ﬁnancial crisis in
1997/1998, that a lack of transparency contributed to an incorrect risk as-
sessment in emerging markets. According to this view, the large capital
inﬂows in the 1990s were based in part on an overly optimistic perception
of investment opportunities, especially in Asia. The International Mone-
tary Fund (1999a, p. 63) points out that a dramatic reassessment of risk
in emerging markets was a ”cause and a symptom” of the crisis which re-
sulted in reversing net capital ﬂows. The observed volatility of capital ﬂows
to emerging markets, which many observers view as only somewhat linked to
economic fundamentals, have stimulated a new discussion about the risks and
beneﬁts of ﬁnancial liberalization. There are at least four distinct aspects of
ﬁnancial liberalization which might have diﬀerent impacts on the stability of
capital ﬂows and ﬁnancial stability in general: capital account liberalization,
liberalization of trade in ﬁnancial services, domestic deregulation and the
introduction of new ﬁnancial instruments.
This paper focuses on the role of trade in ﬁnancial services.1 Following
Tamirisa (1999, p. 4) capital account liberalization is deﬁn e da st h ea c c e s so f
residents to international ﬁnancial markets and of non-residents to domes-
tic ﬁnancial markets. Trade in ﬁnancial services is deﬁned as the provision
of ﬁnancial services, such as retail and wholesale banking, securities trad-
ing and portfolio management, in exchange for fees across borders. This
means that residents may use ﬁnancial services of foreign ﬁnancial institu-
tions and that domestic ﬁnancial institutions may provide ﬁnancial services
to non-residents. These two aspects of ﬁnancial liberalization are distinct,
but somewhat related: If ﬁnancial services are provided ”cross-border”, cap-
ital inﬂows or outﬂows are necessarily associated.2 On the other hand, if the
services are supplied by a subsidiary or a local branch of the foreign bank,
capital in- or outﬂows do not have to coincide. In that case, only the foreign
direct investment to set up the local presence is a direct consequence of ﬁnan-
cial services trade. Since commitments towards ﬁnancial services trade can
be made in principle independently from any commitment to capital account
liberalization, it does make sense to study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial services trade
1For a survey on theoretical and empirical work on capital account liberalization, see
Eichengreen and Mussa (1998). For the impact of domestic deregulation in the ﬁnancial
services sector on ﬁnancial stability, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). For an
empirical investigation of the impact of the introduction of new ﬁnancial instruments, see
Jochum and Kodres (1998).
2”Cross-border” refers to a so-called mode of supply where the foreign supplier does
not penetrate the home country. See Appendix A.1.1 for details.
2separately.3
An analysis of the speciﬁce ﬀect of opening up ﬁnancial services markets
to foreign competition can provide useful guidelines for the policy stance of
emerging market economies towards the upcoming negotiations on a further
liberalization of trade in ﬁnancial services at the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Despite the failure to launch a new comprehensive round of trade
negotiations in December 1999, services are on the built-in agenda of the
Uruguay-Round.
A useful starting point is the paper by Kono and Schuknecht (1998),
hereafter KS, who have argued that ﬁnancial services trade liberalization,
which allows the use of a broad array of ﬁnancial instruments and the pres-
ence of foreign banks, contributes to more stable capital ﬂows to emerging
markets. It is indeed remarkable that most of the Asian countries which
were severely hit by the crisis had fairly restrictive and distortionary regimes
with regard to trade in ﬁnancial services. Alba, Bhattacharya, Claessens,
Gosh, and Hernandez (1999, p. 49) point out that the limited role of foreign
banks in Asia inhibited institutional development. Other countries, such as
Argentina, have adopted more liberal regimes, and there is some evidence
that foreign banks played a stabilizing role in these countries.4
In order to empirically test their hypothesis, KS developed various indices
which measure the restrictiveness and the degree of distortion of the trade
regime with regard to ﬁnancial services. These are based on commitments
within the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).5 In a sample
of 26 emerging markets, including countries in Asia, Latin America, Eastern
Europe and Africa, they ﬁnd support for their hypothesis. In a cross-country
regression of the standard deviation of annual net capital ﬂows from 1991-
1997 on ﬁnancial services trade policy variables, macroeconomic and other
regulatory variables, a liberal trade regime regarding ﬁnancial services has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the standard deviation of capital ﬂows.
This paper argues that the theoretical case for the argument brought
forward is rather ambiguous and extends the existing evidence in various
ways: it is asserted that the appropriate ﬁgure to consider is the volatility
3Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, capital ﬂo w sh a v et ob el i b e r -
alized only for cross-border supply, otherwise these commitments would be useless. For
committments allowing commercial presence, only the foreign direct investment necessary
to install the presence has to be liberalized.
4Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney (2000) ﬁnd that foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico
contributed to a more rapid loan growth and a reduced volatility of overall banking sector
loan growth.
5See Appendix A.1.1 for a brief description of ﬁnancial services liberalization within
the GATS.
3of total net capital ﬂows, and not of diﬀe r e n tc o m p o n e n t s .T h et i m ep e r i o d
for the data on capital ﬂo w si se x p a n d e dt oi n c l u d et h es e c o n dc r i s i sy e a r
of 1998 which adds considerably to the overall variability of capital ﬂows in
the 1990s. Moreover, the data set is expanded to a total of 54 emerging
and developing countries. Finally, it is tested whether the results are robust
to alternative measures of volatility and to alternative measures for trade in
ﬁnancial services: foreign bank penetration and the trade regime with regard
to ﬁnancial services as suggested by KS.
Contrary to the ﬁndings by KS, it is found that foreign bank penetration
tends to rather increase the volatility of capital ﬂows. The trade regime vari-
ables are not signiﬁcant in explaining cross-country variations in the volatility
of capital ﬂows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the arguments made in favor and against ﬁnancial services trade and foreign
bank penetration. Section 3 discusses methodological issues and the selection
of appropriate independent and dependent variables. In section 4 the results
of benchmark regressions are presented. Section 5 tests whether the results
are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of volatility. Section 6 concludes.
2 The debate in the literature
T h ec a s ef o ra n da g a i n s tﬁnancial services trade is discussed controversially
among policy makers and in the academic literature.6 The eﬀects are likely to
depend on how the foreign services are supplied, i.e. through a local presence
or through cross-border supply.
On the one hand, it is often argued that the ﬁnancial services trade leads
to traditional gains from trade, i.e. more competition, and thus to more
eﬃciency in the banking sector with more services at lower prices. Secondly,
ﬁnancial services trade brings about a transfer of know-how, technology and
skills such as proper credit risk management practices. Thirdly, it can raise
pressure on local authorities to provide a better institutional framework with
regard to the supervision of banks and disclosure standards. Finally, the
home head oﬃces of foreign banks can serve as a credible lender of last re-
sort in a crisis situation. The positive eﬀects on ﬁnancial sector development
are also likely to enhance growth.7 These eﬀects are likely to take place if
6For a survey of the arguments, see Tamirisa, Sorsa, Bannister, Mcdonald, and Wiec-
zorek (2000).
7Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998) provide extensive empirical evidence
that foreign bank entry tends to improve eﬃciency in domestic banking markets. For the
argument related to institutional capacity building, see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
4the services are provided through a local presence of foreign banks. A pro-
competitive eﬀect through cross-border supply will be more limited because
proximity to the client is still relevant in ﬁnancial services. The positive
eﬀects through know-how transfer and institutional pressures can hardly be
expected for cross-border supply. With regard to the stability of capital
ﬂows, KS argue that ﬁnancial services trade liberalization, which allows the
use of a broad array of ﬁnancial instruments and the presence of foreign
banks, can contribute to more stable capital ﬂows. One channel pointed out
by KS (p. 10) works as follows. Foreign ﬁnancial institutions in emerging
markets can compile better information about the creditworthiness of bor-
rowers if they have a local presence. This facilitates proper risk assessment
by international investors who are, in turn, less likely to engage in herding
behavior.8 The pressure on local authorities to provide a better institutional
framework which, in turn, leads to more transparency, works in the same di-
rection. Recently, however, Morris and Shin (1999) showed theoretically that
more information does not necessarily reduce market volatility if a strategic
coordination problem among investors is at work.
The theoretical case for a stability-enhancing eﬀect of ﬁnancial services
trade gets even weaker if one considers that the entry of foreign banks can
be harmful by itself if they start operating in a weak local banking sys-
tem. Eichengreen and Mussa (1998, p. 21 and p. 27) stress that in such
a situation foreign competition can provoke a banking crisis because lower
margins for domestic banks can make them more vulnerable to loan losses.
They call ﬁnancial services trade liberalization in a weak domestic banking
system a ”delicate matter”. Domestic banks might respond to increased
competition by taking excessive risks. Moreover, there might be the danger
that foreign banks promote capital ﬂight, and that they rapidly withdraw
from local markets during a ﬁnancial crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
have stressed that in such a situation, foreign banks may worsen ﬁnancial
distress by calling in loans and cancel credit lines to domestic ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. This would have rather a destabilizing eﬀect on the volatility of
capital ﬂows. Since ﬁnancial services trade liberalization often coincidences
(1998), KS, and Eichengreen and Mussa (1998, p. 27). On the role of foreign banks as a
lender of last resort, see KS (p. 12). For evidence on positive growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial
sector development, see King and Levine (1993).
8Herding in ﬁnancial markets can be rational for various reasons. For a survey on
theoretical foundations of herding behavior, see Devenow and Welch (1996). Recently,
Calvo and Mendoza (2000) have shown that in a growing global securities market, there
might be little incentives for all investors to gather costly country-speciﬁc information
and herding, i.e. imitating an arbitrary market portfolio, can be the outcome of optimal
portfolio decisions.
5with other policy measures of deregulation, it is also necessary to keep the
ﬁndings by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) in mind. They ﬁnd that
ﬁnancial liberalization, measured by the deregulation of bank interest rates,
which takes place in a weak institutional environment, makes banking crises
more likely. Finally, it is sometimes argued that foreign banks dominate the
most the most proﬁtable market segments leaving domestic banks with the
more risky projects, and thus making the domestic ﬁnancial system more
vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises.
The controversial arguments in favor and against free ﬁnancial services
trade, in particular with regard to its eﬀect on the stability of capital ﬂows
have lead many to conclude that this eﬀect is ambiguous.9
3M e t h o d o l o g y a n d D a t a
This paper expands one type of empirical analysis carried out by KS. In a
cross-country regression of a volatility measure of net capital ﬂows on ﬁnan-
cial services trade variables, macroeconomic and other regulatory variables, it
is tested whether ﬁnancial services trade variables tend to reduce the volatil-
ity of capital ﬂows.10
KS also suggest a regression of the level of net capital ﬂows on these vari-
ables. In their sample, ”other investment” (mainly bank lending), measured
by the standard deviation, is more volatile than portfolio investment, and
portfolio investment is more volatile than foreign direct investment. Conse-
quently, they argue, if ﬁnancial services trade variables tend to raise the level
of a speciﬁct y p eo fc a p i t a lﬂow relative to other ﬂows, say portfolio invest-
ment relative to other investment, this can be called a stability-promoting
property. This approach is not pursued here because it is not clear whether
such an inference about stability is justiﬁed. While it is true that ”other in-
vestment” has historically been the most volatile component of capital ﬂows,
there is no evidence that the composition of capital ﬂows has a systematic
eﬀect on the volatility of total net capital ﬂows. The International Monetary
Fund (1999a, p. 65) stresses that even increases in foreign direct investment
9See Tamirisa, Sorsa, Bannister, Mcdonald, and Wieczorek (2000, p. 12).
10From a macroeconomic standpoint, it could be argued that it makes little sense to
analyse capital ﬂows in isolation from the current account. However, attempts to develop
a full structural model of capital ﬂows which identiﬁes the shocks that lead to changes in the
current account turned out to be diﬃcult and there are reasons to assume that especially
portfolio ﬂows are rather exogeneous from the standpoint of the emerging market economy.
See Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1995, pp. 155) for more details about this argument
and the references given there.
6ﬂows, by all measures the most stable component of capital ﬂows, does not
automatically lead to more stable net foreign ﬁnancing.
3.1 The dependent variable
The question of how to measure the volatility of capital ﬂo w si sn o tat r i v i a l
one. KS suggest to compute the standard deviation of various types of net
capital ﬂows as a share of GDP. Two problems arise with this approach.
Firstly, instead of examining the determinants of volatility for each type of
capital ﬂows separately, total net capital ﬂows are considered here. Claessens,
Dooley, and Warner (1995) have pointed out that the question about volatil-
ity is motivated by the concern of policy makers about sudden reversals in
the total capital account and not just in some particular ﬂow. They show
for numerous countries that there is a high degree of substitution between
various capital ﬂows. Moreover, they ﬁnd that movements in the overall
capital account are little inﬂuenced by movements of speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t s .
Movements of one type of ﬂow can be oﬀset by another type of ﬂow. Hence,
it can be misleading to look at movements of one particular ﬂow. There is
no variable in the regressions which explains shifts from one type of capital
ﬂow to another. The ﬁnancial services trade variables are supposed to re-
ﬂect rather a more general uncertainty about investment opportunities which
should be reﬂected in an increased volatility of the aggregate of foreign direct
investment, portfolio, and other investment ﬂows.
Secondly, the coeﬃcient of variation, computed for absolute net capital
ﬂows is used as the volatility measure in the benchmark regression of this
paper. Although it is common to compare net capital ﬂo w sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s
by looking at the share in GDP of these ﬂows, such a measure might be
misleading if we want to explain diﬀerent volatilities across countries. If a
country experiences a sharp recession during a ﬁnancial crisis, the scale of
outﬂows looks more dramatic than if the recession had been less severe. This
eﬀect will also be reﬂected in a higher volatility. The explanatory variables
used here oﬀer no explanation of GDP contraction during a crisis.
3.2 Independent variables
Financial services trade variables: The most straightforward vari-
able to measure the openness of the ﬁnancial sector is simply foreign bank
penetration. Notice that this measure relates to a supply through a local pres-
ence, and hence more stability-enhancing eﬀects should be expected from this
variable. The following two variables are included in the regressions in order
7to test whether a direct link of foreign bank penetration and the volatility of
capital ﬂows exists:
• Share of foreign banks (number) equals the number of foreign banks in
total banks.
• Share of foreign banks (assets) equals the share of foreign bank assets
in total banking sector assets.
However, the role that foreign banks play for the stability of capital ﬂows
might be a more complex process which requires more subtle regulatory mea-
sures, especially if one wants to capture the claim that commercial presence
tends to be more stability-enhancing than cross-border supply. The follow-
ing three indices developed by KS assess speciﬁc distortions and biases in
the trade regime which are likely to contribute to capital ﬂow volatility. This
paper uses the assessments by KS, but adds more countries to the sample
which have been classiﬁed in a similar way.
• Bias towards cross-border supply is an indicator (see Appendix A.1.2
for details) which measures to what extent the ﬁnancial services trade
regime favors cross-border supply relative to commercial presence. The
desired eﬀects on improved transparency and a diﬀusion of skills in risk
management occur presumably only if foreign banks have a local pres-
ence. While cross-border supply generates pro-competitive eﬀects as
well, it does not contribute to more stable capital ﬂows. Since the
stability-enhancing properties of ﬁnancial services trade only occur if
banks establish a local presence, we would expect that a bias towards
cross-border supply increases the volatility of capital ﬂows, i.e. a posi-
tive sign of coeﬃcient is expected.
• Bias towards bank lending indicates whether the trade regime favors
classical bank lending/depositing services as opposed to securities-related
services (see Appendix A.1.2 for details). If foreign banks are allowed
to oﬀer a broad spectrum of ﬁnancial instruments, they are likely to
contribute to the development of bond and stock markets. KS (p.13)
claim that these, in turn, can increase transparency because they re-
duce information asymmetries. Stock prices and bond ratings should
reﬂect all available information about a ﬁrm’s soundness.11 Moreover,
11This is the case if capital markets are eﬃcient. This hypothesis was subject to a long
debate. If investor behavior is rather charaterized by imitative strategies, bubbles can
occur and market prices can substantially deviate from fundamentals. See e.g. Shiller
(1992).
8securities markets usually require higher standards of disclosure. Ab-
sent capital market ﬁnance also leads to an exclusive reliance on bank
lending which has historically been the most volatile component of cap-
ital ﬂows. Thus, a bias towards bank lending would lead to an increase
of volatility, i.e. a positive sign of coeﬃcient is expected.
• Restrictions on foreign banks measures the extent to which activities
of foreign banks are limited by discriminatory regulation. KS focus on
four restrictions which are likely to oﬀset the stability-enhancing eﬀects
of commercial presence of foreign banks. These are
i) limits on equity participation in domestic ﬁnancial institutions,
ii) limits on raising domestic ﬁnancing,
iii) limits on the establishment of a branch network, and
iv) limits on the issuance of new bank licences.
Limited equity participation can undermine foreign banks’ ability to ex-
ercise corporate control on domestic banks which would make them more
transparent. When foreign banks cannot raise domestic funding, they have
to rely on international capital markets. The induced capital ﬂows might
be volatile if this fund raising coincidences with a lack of transparency. If
foreign banks are not allowed to set up a branch network, they are deprived
from engaging in retail banking. Since wholesale business tends to be more
volatile than retail business, this can contribute to an increased volatility.
The lack of a domestic depositor base leads to capital inﬂows which can, if
there is a lack of transparency, exhibit high volatility. Limits on the issuance
of new bank licences lowers the scope of commercial presence in general. KS
construct an index for these four restrictions (see Appendix A.1.2 for details).
More restrictions on foreign banks of this type will increase the volatility of
capital ﬂows, i.e. a positive sign of coeﬃcient is expected.
Macroeconomic and other regulatory Variables
• The average inﬂation rate is included because high inﬂation rates are
related to macroeconomic instability. It is correlated with large move-
ments in interest rates and the exchange rate. In order to achieve a
parsimonious parametrization, this is the only macroeconomic variable
that enters the regressions. Logarithms are taken in order avoid a too
b i gw e i g h to ft h ep e r i o d so fh y p e r i n ﬂation in Latin America in the
beginning of the 1990s.
9• Economic freedom is an index published regularly by Johnson, Holmes,
and Kirkpatrick (1999). The greater the score, the greater the level of
government interference in the economy. Government interference, such
as explicit or implicit guarantees, should decrease market transparency
and thus increase the volatility of capital ﬂows, i.e. a positive sign of
coeﬃcient is expected.
• Rule of law is an index which measures to which extent the law is
respected in a country. Stronger institutions, in particular with regard
to the enforcement of property rights are likely to reduce the volatility
of capital ﬂows.
Since the regulatory variables considered here do not vary much over
time, indices which were compiled once are used as proxies for the whole
time period of 1990-98.
3.3 The sample of countries and descriptive statistics
In order to ensure proper econometric regressions which do not suﬀer from a
small sample bias, a large number of observations is clearly desirable. There-
fore, no a priori selection of countries has been done. The sample size is
determined only by data availability. All emerging markets for which data
on foreign bank penetration, the ﬁnancial services trade regime, the indices
of economic freedom and the rule of law are available have been included in
the sample. For a total of 56 countries, data on foreign bank penetration and
the macroeconomic and regulatory variables are available (see table 1).
Variable
Foreign banks (assets) Bias cross-border
Foreign banks (number) Bias bank lending
Restric. foreign banks
Economic Freedom Economic Freedom
Rule of Law Rule of Law
Inﬂation Inﬂation
Total net capital ﬂows Total net capital ﬂows
56 countries (group 1) 36 countries (group 2)
Table 1: Data availability for two groups of variables
10Level Share CV Fora Forn EF Rule Inﬂ
Mean 1791.6 1.61 2.31 0.28 0.32 2.96 3.31 2.88
S.D. 4886.7 5.15 3.78 0.21 0.13 0.54 1.06 1.54
Min -14854.8 -21.83 0.32 0.01 0.08 1.30 1.25 0.06
Max 21096.72 18.22 20.56 0.85 0.67 4.05 5.25 7.31
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Group 1, 56 observations
Level Share CV Restrict Bias1 Bias2 EF Rule Inﬂ
Mean 3121.87 2.68 2.15 1.89 -0.67 1.17 2.83 3.63 2.82
S.D. 5113.26 3.64 3.47 1.38 0.83 1.54 0.55 1.14 1.44
Min -3444.95 -8.32 0.33 0.00 -2.00 0.00 1.30 1.25 0.06
Max 21096.73 8.82 19.32 4.00 1.00 4.00 3.80 6.00 6.84
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Group 2, 36 observations
Since not all countries have signed the GATS agreement on ﬁnancial ser-
vices, the total number of countries which have data on the ﬁnancial services
trade regime is only 36.12 A list of these two groups of countries can be found
in Appendix A.3. Note that group 2 is almost a prefect subset of group 1.
Table 2 and 3 show some descriptive statistics for the two groups of
countries. The variable names are assigned as follows:
Level: Time average (1990-98) of total net capital ﬂows in mill. of dollars;
Share: Time average (1990-98) of total net capital ﬂo w sa sas h a r ei nG D P ;
CV: Absolute value of the coeﬃcient of variation of total net capital ﬂows;
Fora: Average share of foreign banks (assets) (1990-97), in percent;
Forn: Average share of foreign banks (number) (1990-97), in percent;
Bias1: Bias towards cross-border supply, index;
Bias2: Bias towards bank lending, index;
Restrict: Restrictions on foreign banks, index;
EF: Economic Freedom, index;
Rule: Rule of Law, index;
Inﬂ: Log of average inﬂation (1990-98).
4 Results of the benchmark regressions
Table 4 shows the results of the benchmark regressions. The dependent vari-
able is the coeﬃcient of variation of total net capital ﬂows. Five regressions
12For six more countries, GATS committments are only available in Spanish. These
countries are not included in the sample.
11are run in order to test separately which of the ﬁnancial services trade vari-
ables tend to aﬀect the coeﬃcient of variation. In all ﬁve regressions, it is
controlled for the same macroeconomic and regulatory variables.13
Five key observations can be drawn from these regressions:
1. The explanatory power of the regressions is very low. The adjusted
R2 is below 20% for all of the regressions. The explanatory power of
the foreign bank penetration variables is higher than the one of the
t r a d er e g i m ev a r i a b l e s .
2. Foreign bank penetration tends to increase the volatility of capital
ﬂows. Here, the market share of foreign banks matters. While the
share of foreign banks’ assets in total assets is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, the share in the total number of banks is not signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
3. The trade regime variables are not signiﬁcant in explaining cross-country
diﬀerences in the volatility of capital ﬂows. The t-Statistics for all three
of these variables are far below common levels of signiﬁcance.
4. Inﬂation is also not signiﬁcant in explaining the diﬀerences in volatili-
ties.
5. The degree to which the law is respected in a country does reduce the
volatility of capital ﬂo w s . T h ev a r i a b l ei ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 5% level
or better in all ﬁve regressions. Economic Freedom, however, is not
signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations.
The fact that foreign bank penetration increases the volatility of capital
ﬂows indicates that the concerns about foreign competition, in particular in
a weak domestic banking system might be justiﬁed.14 The ﬁnding that the
trade regime variables are not signiﬁcant raises doubts whether the stability-
enhancing eﬀects described above take place automatically and whether they
oﬀset the possibly negative impact on ﬁnancial stability. They could also
13Two outliers with an extremely high coeﬃcent of variation have been eliminated from
group 1, one outlier from group 2.
14It could also indicate that foreign presence in many countries is rather due to historical
factors than to a liberal trade regime. KS (p. 30) have stressed that in these cases foreign
presence in otherwise closed ﬁnancial systems without the possibility of new entry is not
very likely to generate any stability-enhancing eﬀects. However, this argument is not
compelling because no evidence of any stability-enhancing eﬀects of the trade regime are
found here.
12Dependent Variable:
Volatility of total net capital ﬂows
[Coeﬃcient of Variation]
Independent var.
Fora
2.11
(2.2)∗∗
Forn
2.29
(1.54)
Bias1
0.12
(0.33)
Bias2
0.13
(0.63)
Restrict
0.12
(0.57)
Inﬂ
-0.04
(-0.30)
-0.09
(-0.59)
-0.12
(-0.46)
-0.1
(-0.41)
-0.11
(-0.45)
EF
-0.05
(-0.23)
-0.06
(-0.23)
0.06
(0.18)
0.03
(0.09)
-0.02
(-0.06)
Rul
0.42
(2.82)∗∗∗
0.42
(2.65)∗∗
0.52
(2.62)∗∗
0.48
(2.32)∗∗
0.5
(2.53)∗∗
Observations 54 54 35 35 35
R2 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05
Table 4: Determinants of volatility measured by the coeﬃcient of variation;
Coeﬃcients and (t-Statistics) of OLS estimates; *, **, ***: signiﬁcant at the
10, 5, 1 % level
13indicate that coordination problems which are not necessarily amended by
better information are at the root of the volatility of capital ﬂows.
However, it is important to keep in mind that GATS commitments are
only a very crude measure of actual trade policies pursued. Moreover, only
countries which made liberalization commitments are included in the sam-
ple. With only 36 observations, these results should be treated with a little
caution.
The poor performance of the only macroeconomic variable that is included
in the regressions, inﬂation, suggests that for long-run average ﬁgures, the
regulatory environment matters more than macroeconomic factors.
Finally, it seems what matters most for diﬀerences in volatility is respect
for the law. Surprisingly, however, government involvement in the economy
does not increase the volatility of capital ﬂows. Crony capitalism with ex-
plicit and implicit state guarantees that directed resources into non-proﬁtable
projects might have contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis in some Asian coun-
tries, but there is no evidence of a broader relationship of economic freedom
and the volatility of capital ﬂows.
5 Robustness to alternative speciﬁcations
In order to make the results of this paper comparable to the ﬁndings by
KS, the standard deviation of the respective shares in GDP are also used as
dependent variable. Moreover, the number of sign changes is considered as
an alternative measure of volatility. It counts every switch from a positive
to negative value as one, i.e. it counts episodes of changes of directions
of capital ﬂows which usually coincidence with the beginning of a ﬁnancial
crisis or the start of (over-)optimism after a period of net outﬂows. Appendix
A.4 contains the results of the regressions which have the same independent
variables as the benchmark regressions.
If the standard deviation of shares in GDP is used as a dependent variable,
only observation 2 of the benchmark regression has to be modiﬁed. All
other observations are robust to this change in speciﬁcation. Foreign bank
penetration does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the volatility of capital ﬂows.
This is true for both measures. The rule of law variable is even signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
The same is true for regressions where the number of sign changes is
the dependent variable. The t-Statistics of the coeﬃcients of foreign bank
penetration, however, are very close to the critical value of the 10% level of
signiﬁcance.
146C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined empirically the relation between the volatility of
capital ﬂows, foreign bank penetration and a liberal trade regime with regard
to ﬁnancial services. It was argued that such a relationship should be tested
for total net capital ﬂows, and not for speciﬁc components. It was found
some evidence for foreign bank penetration to rather increase the volatility
of capital ﬂows. However, this result is not robust to alternative speciﬁcations
of volatility. No evidence for any signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the trade regime with
regard to ﬁnancial services was found. This could indicate that the volatility
of capital ﬂows to emerging markets was not primarily caused by a lack of
transparency and information.
Nevertheless, regarding the policy stance of emerging markets towards a
further liberalization of trade in ﬁnancial services, it should be kept in mind
that the eﬃciency losses from a closed ﬁnancial sector are possibly large.15
In order minimize the risks, liberalization should only take place in an ap-
propriate institutional environment such an eﬃcient bank supervision and
proper disclosure standards. A transparent licensing process should ensure
that only sound foreign banks enter the domestic market. There might be
the case for solving problems of non-performing loans prior to liberaliza-
tion. However, foreign banks could also be helpful in this process if they
participate in mergers and privatization. With regard to the liberalization of
cross-border supply even more caution is needed since it necessarily involves
capital ﬂows. It should only take place as part of a coherent, well-sequenced
liberalization strategy within a consistent macroeconomic framework and ex-
change rate regime. Free cross-border supply does not in general preclude the
introduction of temporary capital controls. These policies have probably not
been pursued in the past. Therefore, in some countries, ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion did indeed coincidence with ﬁnancial crises. This might be an additional
reason why stability-enhancing eﬀects are diﬃcult to ﬁnd empirically.
Further research should include in cross-country regressions additional
variables which measure speciﬁcally more aspects of ﬁnancial liberalization
and other macroeconomic variables which are used in the prediction literature
on currency crises. Moreover, a panel data analysis where observations of
changes in capital ﬂows are the dependent variable would be probably fruitful
because dynamic interactions could be examined. Such an analysis would be
especially interesting if data on ﬁnancial liberalization in time were available.
15Some of these recommendations draw on Tamirisa, Sorsa, Bannister, Mcdonald, and
Wieczorek (2000).
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17A Appendix
A.1 Financial services trade regime variables
A.1.1 Financial services liberalization in the GATS
Financial services were integrated into the GATS framework in December
1997. After diﬃcult negotiations, the ﬁnancial services agreement (FSA)
was signed by 102 WTO members. The commitments came into force in
March 1999. However, most of the FSA is a formalization of the status quo.16
Therefore, KS use the FSA commitments, as proxies for actual policies in the
1990s.
The GATS distinguishes four modes of supply (see table 5). Diﬀerential
c o m m i t m e n t sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent modes of supply are allowed.
Mode 1 Cross-border supply
Mode 2 Consumption abroad
Mode 3 Commercial Presence
Mode 4 Presence of natural persons
Table 5: Modes of supply in the GATS
Cross-border supply and commercial presence are the two most relevant
modes of supply of ﬁnancial services. Whereas the ﬁrst refers to a service
which is provided without the foreign bank entering the country, e.g. by
telephone or on-line, the second takes place if the service is provided by a
the domestic subsidiary or branch of a foreign bank.
A.1.2 The KS Indicators of the ﬁnancial services trade regime
Bias towards cross-border supply The index reﬂects the relative
level of commitments under mode 1 and mode 3 (see table 6).
The bias index is the sum of the two columns. It ranges from -2 to 2 where
-2 means no commitments in mode 1, full liberalization in mode 3 while an
index value of 2 means just the opposite: no commitments under mode 3, full
liberalization of mode 1. The lower the index, the more stability-enhancing
the trade regime.
16See Dobson and Jacquet (1998, p. 2) and KS.
18Mode 1 Mode 3
No commitment 0 0
Partial liberalization 1 -1
Full liberalization 2 -2
Table 6: Assigned scores for the bias towards cross-border supply
Bias towards bank lending This index assigns a higher score to the
trade regime if the commitments are biased towards bank lending relative to
capital market ﬁnance. The more severe the bias, the higher the score (see
table 7).
Equal commitments or bias towards securities 0
Weak bias for bank lending 2
Strong bias for bank lending 4
Table 7: Assigned scores for the lending bias
Restrictions on foreign banks The index counts the number of the
described four restrictions and ranges therefor from 0 to 4.
A.2 Data Sources and computational remarks
Annual capital ﬂow data for the sample countries are obtained in US
dollars for the time period of 1990-1998. The IFS distinguishes three types
of capital ﬂows: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and
other investment. Net ﬂows are calculated by netting the respective assets
and liabilities. The sum of all three types of net ﬂows is called total net
capital ﬂows, the IFS refer to this ﬁgure as the ﬁnancial account. As is
explained above, this is the aggregated variable which will be considered
here. The coeﬃcient of variation is computed as the absolute value of the
standard deviation divided by the mean.
Inﬂation is the average from 1990-98 of the year-on-year percentage
change in the consumer price index.
Annual data on the share of foreign banks in the total number and
total assets of the domestic ﬁnancial sector are obtained from the Database
on Financial Development and Structure, which was recently published by
19Source Published by
Total net capital ﬂows IFS, line 78bjd IMF (1999b)
Inﬂation IFS, line 64 IMF (1999b)
GDP in U.S. dollars WEO database IMF (1999c)
Foreign banks assets/number World Bank database Beck et al. (1999)
Index of Economic Freedom Johnson et al. (1999)
GATS committments GATS schedules, KS WTO (1998), KS
Table 8: Data sources
the World Bank.17 Ab a n ki sd e ﬁned as foreign if at least 50% of the equity
is owned by foreigners.
See table 8 for a complete list of data sources.
A.3 List of countries
A.3.1 Group 1
ARGENTINA
BAHAMAS
BAHRAIN
BANGLADESH
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
CAMEROON
CHILE
CHINA,P.R.
COLOMBIA
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF
COSTA RICA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
17See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) for a description of the database.
20EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA
GUYANA
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
KENYA
KOREA
MADAGASCAR
MALAYSIA
MALI
MEXICO
MOROCCO
NAMIBIA
NICARAGUA
NIGERIA
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
ROMANIA
RUSSIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOUTH AFRICA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UGANDA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
21A.3.2 Group 2
ARGENTINA
BAHRAIN
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
CHILE
CHINA,P.R.
COSTA RICA
CZECH REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
GHANA
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
JAMAICA
KENYA
KOREA
MALAYSIA
MALTA
MEXICO
MOROCCO
NEW ZEALAND
NIGERIA
PAKISTAN
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
ROMANIA
SENEGAL
SINGAPORE
SOUTH AFRICA
SRI LANKA
THAILAND
TURKEY
VENEZUELA
22A.4 Further regression results
Dependent Variable:
Volatility of total net capital ﬂows
[Standard deviation of shares in GDP]
Independent var.
Fora
0.39
(0.28)
Forn
1.33
(0.61)
Bias1
0.28
(0.67)
Bias2
-0.09
(-0.34)
Restrict
-0.044
(-0.16)
Inﬂ
0.12
(0.57)
0.11
(0.53)
0.07
(0.22)
0.03
(0.11)
0.04
(0.14)
EF
0.10
(0.33)
0.05
(0.16)
0.09
(0.21)
0.09
(0.22)
0.10
(0.22)
Rule
0.83
(3.9)∗∗∗
0.8
(3.53)∗∗∗
1.01
(3.98)∗∗∗
0.99
(3.89)∗∗∗
0.98
(3.88)∗∗∗
Observations 49 49 32 32 32
R2 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.09 0.09
Table 9: Determinants of volatility, measured by the standard deviation of
shares in GDP; Coeﬃcients and (t-Statistics) of OLS estimates; *, **, ***:
signiﬁcant at the 10, 5, 1 % level
23Dependent Variable:
Volatility of total net capital ﬂows
[Number of Sign Changes]
Independent variables
Fora
1.47
(1.63)
Forn
1.65
(1.15)
Bias1
0.36
(1.36)
Bias2
-0.15
(-0.93)
Restrict
0.03
(0.17)
Inﬂ
0.08
(0.58)
0.05
(0.33)
0.06
(0.33)
0.01
(0.07)
0.04
(0.19)
EF
0.04
(0.17)
0.05
(0.24)
0.15
(0.59)
0.17
(0.63)
0.11
(0.4)
Rule
0.26
(1.85)∗
0.24
(1.59)
0.3
(1.90)∗
0.3
(1.88)∗
0.27
(1.67)
Observations 49 49 32 32 32
R2 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.15 0.12
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.03
Table 10: Determinants of volatility measured by the number of sign changes;
Coeﬃcients and (t-Statistics) of OLS estimates; *, **, ***: signiﬁcant at the
10, 5, 1 % level
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